UNDERSTANDING THE RACIAL DISCOURSE
OF JUSTICE REHNQUIST
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most potent effects of story derive not from what is told, what is
positively represented.., but from what is omitted, not told. 1

How do we judge the accumulated work of a Supreme Court
Justice? Professor (now Judge) Easterbrook suggested several years

ago that certain forms of criticism of a court were inappropriate when
they did not account for multiple-judge aspects of American appellate
courts. 2 Similarly, we do the individual judges a disservice if we
examine only the stated part of their judicial opinions. While various
factors enter into the decisionmaking process, an individual judge may
simply not state all the factors which motivate her towards a particular
result. In addition to the arguments actually articulated, there is a "deep
theory," what literary critics call the story.
This story is frequently the most important part of the writing
enterprise to the reader. Legal commentators have written about aspects
of story and Supreme Court jurisprudence. 3 Justices Kennedy and
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. B.A. 1972, University of
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1. KARL KROEBER, RETELLING/REREADING: THE FATE OF STORYTELLING IN MODERN
TIMES 19 (1990); see also Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak: Some Lessons on
Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist, 57 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1982).
2. Frank Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 81516 (1982); see also Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 808-09 (1983).
3. Thomas Ross has written a number of articles about the story being told by
Supreme Court Justices. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L.
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O'Connor explained the impact Justice Marshall's story about race and
the law had on their own deliberations, 4 though some of us wish that
these Justices had paid more attention. However, without these stories
the results might easily have been worse. 5 While much of Justice
REV. 297 (1990) (examining the use of innocence in affirmative action discourse to
validate the claims of white workers who are "unconnected" to the racism in the world)
[hereinafter Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action]; Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of
Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991) (demonstrating
that Supreme Court Justices tell a story about class, race and law in their opinions);
Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1990) (showing that racial themes in nineteenth-century cases
are still present in contemporary cases); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives,68 TEx.
L. REv. 381 (1989) (examining the stories that the various Justices were telling in their
opinions in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)). For a powerful
analysis of the story of race and the Supreme Court, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our
Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (examining the story told by the
Justices about race in historical and contemporary terms).
4. Anthony M. Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall,44 STAN. L. REV. 1221
(1992). Justice O'Connor also shared her experiences:
I have perhaps been most personally affected by Justice Marshall as raconteur. It
was rare during our conference deliberations that he would not share an anecdote, a
joke or a story; yet, in my ten years on the bench with him, I cannot recall ever
hearing the same "T7M" story twice. In my early months as the junior Justice, I
looked forward to these tales as welcome diversions from the heavy, often
troublesome, task of deciding the complex legal issues before us. But over time,
as I heard more clearly what Justice Marshall was saying, I realized that behind
most of the anecdotes was a relevant legal point .... Through his story, Justice
Marshall reminded us, once again, that the law is not an abstract concept removed
from the society it serves, and that judges, as safeguarders of the Constitution,
must constantly strive to narrow the gap between the ideal of equal justice and the
reality of social inequality.
Id. at 1217-18.
5. For example, Justice O'Connor wrote that "[o]ur continued adherence to the
standard of review employed in Wygant does not, as Justice Marshall's dissent suggests,
...indicate that we view 'racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past' or
that 'governmental bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial
injustice."' City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (citations

omitted).
Justice O'Connor has consistently been more able to perceive the complaints of
women, rather than those of racial minorities, despite her listening to the stories of
Justice Marshall. This should not surprise us. However, disclaiming any particularly

feminist jurisprudence, Justice O'Connor wrote:
Do women judges decide cases differently by virtue of being women? I would echo
the answer of my colleague, Justice Jeanne Coyne of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, who responded that "a wise old man and a wise old woman reach the
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Marshall's story was clear, having been impassionately etched into
UnitedStates Reports over the last twenty-five years, 6 there was always
a deeper story about hope and justice for all. This deeper story went
beyond the stated part of his opinions, even including very conservative
7
stories about property and individual liberty.
Chief Justice Rehnquist will be seen as a tremendously important
force on the Supreme Court. As this symposium suggests, his voice on
many issues has been heard loudly by his fellow Justices,
commentators, and lawyers. He has been telling a number of stories
about how the law should function in bringing justice to the world.
Since it is impossible for a single article to cover his entire record, I will
limit my inquiry to the story he has been telling about a topic that
interests me as a scholar-race.
Race has been one of the most important issues on the Court's
docket over the last twenty years. Beyond obvious issues like
affirmative action, school segregation, and employment discrimination,
race has impacted areas as diverse as criminal procedure and First
Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Rehnquist has been telling his story
about race over the last twenty years, and it is important that we tease
out the nature of that story.
In this Article, I will demonstrate that Justice Rehnquist has
reinserted a jurisprudential view of race which seems to draw upon old
notions of white supremacy. The story that Justice Rehnquist tells
adheres to very old doctrines of racial oppression of AfricanAmericans, a story that had all but disappeared from the judicial
discourse. I will contrast Justice Rehnquist's story about race with his
story about economics and his view of the proper influence of
same conclusion." This should be our aspiration: that, whatever our gender or
background, we all may become wise-wise through our different struggles and
different victories, wise through work and play, profession and family.
Sandra D. O'Connor, Portia'sProgress,66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1546, 1558 (1991).
Stories are not always going to be transformative. Indeed, all of us are subject to a
background story of racism which competes with any transformative story, making real
change difficult for judges, law professors and law students. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., You
Can Take Them to Water But You Can't Make them Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and
White Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L. Rnv. 1021.
6. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward A Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1991 DuKE L.J. 39, 48-62 (presenting Justice Marshall as a leader in
creating a black jurisprudence that challenged, to a point, existing legal doctrines).

7.

For a start on describing aspects of those stories, see Cass Sunstein, 0 n

Marshall's Conception of Equality, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1267 (1992).
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economics on legal issues. This contrast will operate as a check on my
analysis of Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of race. I do not claim that
this interpretation will capture all of Justice Rehnquist's opinions, but I
will describe what is arguably his white supremacist viewpoint and why
it has become so important to the legal community. 8

8. Descriptions of this article have created a mini-furor. See Tony Mauro, Theory
Sees Rehnquist as "White Supremacist", LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at 10; 62 Former
Clerks Reject "Outrageous" Attack, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at 45 (letter to the editor
signed by Justice Rehnquist's former clerks expressing their views on this article). Most
of Justice Rehnquist's law clerks believe that the issue I raise about Justice Rehnquist is
unfair to the personal qualities and notions of fairness that he has, in their view,
articulated. Id. This group defended the image of Justice Rehnquist without reading my
remarks or even expressing a serious interest in receiving a copy. They make the mistake
of assuming that all those who help to perpetuate white supremacy are always bad people
or racist in every action, a view I have criticized elsewhere. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Water
Buffalo and Diversity: Naming Names and Reclaiming the Racial Discourse, 26 CONN. L.
REV. 209 (1993). It is important to note that I have not tried to examine the issues in
Justice Rehnquist's career that might suggest that he is a racist in his heart. Others have
made examinations of, for example, his responses in his confirmation hearings to be
Chief Justice. They found Justice Rehnquist to be, at best, disingenuous about his efforts
in opposition to Brown v. Board of Education as a law clerk. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 603-09 (1975); Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Jackson and
the Brown Case, 1988 SuP. CT. REV. 245; Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., An Unabashed Liberal
Looks at a Half-Century of the Supreme Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 213, 242-43 (1990); see
also id. at 245 (Benjamin Hooks, former executive director of the NAACP, stated, "'Night
has fallen on the Court as far as civil rights are concerned [because of the Rehnquist
Court].'"). Those hearings themselves raised a number of questions about Justice
Rehnquist's sensitivity to issues involving people of color. However, I do not think that
history is relevant to Justice Rehnquist's story about race. Whether Justice Rehnquist is a
racist in his heart or his individual actions is irrelevant to my interpretation of that story.
It is the story that is oppressive to the millions of people of color oppressed by the
effects of Supreme Court opinions. Justice Rehnquist may be perfectly fair to the black
employees at the Supreme Court and to black citizens he sees on the street. The issue I
raise in this Article is his fairness to the the interests of black people before the Court.
Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth examine the voting patterns of the Justices on
the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Court in terms of liberal policymaking in a number of
areas, including civil rights and criminal procedure. Rehnquist has the lowest score of any
Justice over that 40-year period by a significant margin. His votes on civil rights
(through 1988) are lower than Justice Scalia. Even taking account of the fact that the
Justices across eras are not facing exactly the same questions over these 40 years, these
numbers are interesting. Rehnquist is almost half as likely to support civil rights policy
as Justice Harlan, the judge who was the least supportive in the Warren and Burger era. See
JEPFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SuPREME COURT AND rmE ArrrruDiNAL MODEL
242-60 (1993).
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II. THE NATURE OF WHITE SUPREMACY

The ideology of white supremacy . . . encompassed attitudes, beliefs,
values, ideals, behavior, and thought on individual, group, and
institutional levels. It subsumed antiblack prejudice and Negrophobia. In
addition, it represented a deep-seated philosophy of black
dehumanization. Predicated upon the assumptions of black cultural
inferiority, black biological inferiority, or both, the ideology of white
supremacy matured and gained intellectual respectability during the
nineteenth century. It signified a rationale and a justification for white
oppression of blacks. 9

White supremacy is a very old doctrine in American political and
legal thought. Great American men and women, including Thomas
Jefferson 10 and Abraham Lincoln, 11 subscribed to versions of white
supremacy. It is, therefore, not surprising that this view of black people
infected Supreme Court Justices of the nineteenth century. As the quote
above suggests, there are two main aspects to white supremacist
thinking. The first is the suggestion that blacks are genetically inferior
and not entitled to the respect due white people. The second is the denial
This view of the relative direction of Justice and Chief Justice Rehnquist is supported
by the work of others as well. Donald Jackson found similar results when examining
Justice Rehnquist's views: of the 10 possible votes on affirmative action, Justice
Rehnquist had voted for a minority plaintiff one-half a time. (The one-half a time was his
vote in support of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Watson that disparate impact analysis
applies to subjective categories.) DONALD W. JACKSON, EVEN THE CHILDREN OF STRANGERS:
EQUALITY UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 124-38 (1992) (Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion finding against minority claimants or their interests in Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989); joined majority opinions against minority plaintiffs in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); joined plurality
opinions against minority claimants in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977 (1988); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); and joined dissents or
wrote a dissent to the approval of minority claimants rights in United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149. 196 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting joined by Rehnquist, C.J.); Local
No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 535 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Local No. 28 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421, 500 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
9. WALDO MARTIN, THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 29 (1984).
10. See, e.g., REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY 101-02 (1981); cf.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia, in WRITINGS 123, 209-14, 288-89
(1984).
11. See, e.g., ROBERT W. JOHANNSEN, LINCOLN, THE SOUTH, AND SLAVERY 31 (1991).
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of cultural equality to black Americans. 12 By cultural equality, I do not
mean that every aspect of every culture is equally good or just. Rather,
those who believe in white supremacy believe that the culture of black
people is inferior because it is the culture of nonwhite ("non-superior")
people.
When the nineteenth-century Court spoke about racial concerns, it
seldom spoke about the cultural inferiority of black Americans. The
most important exception is Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred
Scott.13 Chief Justice Taney certainly spoke in white supremacist terms
when he wrote about the biological inferiority of black Americans:
It is very true, that in that portion of the Union where the labor of the
negro race was found to be unsuited to the climate and unprofitable to the
master, .

.

. [slavery] had entirely worn out in one of [the States], and

measures had been taken for its gradual abolition in several others. But
this change had not been produced by any change of opinion in relation
to this race; but because it was discovered, from experience, that slave
labor was unsuited to the climate and productions of these states .... 14

The Chief Justice also spoke about the cultural inferiority of black slaves
when he explained why they were not entitled to become citizens like
Native Americans:
The situation of this population [slaves] was altogether unlike that of the
Indian race. The latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial
communities, and never amalgamated with them in social connections or
in government. But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free
and independent people ....

15

Expressions of white supremacy were not limited to Chief Justice
Taney. Even great Justices sensitive to aspects of racial subordination
have written in terms that support white supremacy. Justice Harlan
participated in such rhetoric before he excoriated the majority's opinion
in Plessy, writing:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And
so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
12. See ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 91-97 (1987)
(discussing the differences in educational programs and relationships between black and
white students).
13. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
14. Id. at 412.
15. Id. at 403.
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power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights all citizens are
16
equal before the law.

For a number of reasons the overt expression of white supremacy
has been eliminated from the Supreme Court discourse. The Justices,
like the country, have become more tolerant of black Americans. The
Court is much less likely to speak of intolerable conditions for black
people in terms of intellectual or biological fitness or cultural inferiority.
There are exceptions to this change, but they tend to be about nonracial
groups or in areas where the Justices' prejudice continues to have vast
popular support. 17
There are four aspects to the more subtle white supremacist rhetoric
I believe we can discover in the writings of modem Supreme Court
Justices. First, the interests of black Americans are not considered
important enough to be examined or put into the constitutional
calculus-the interest blindness assumption. Second, the assumptions
regarding factual circumstances, e.g., legislative intent, economic or
social policy of social actors, posit that the status quo circumstances of
black citizens are fair-the status quo blindness assumption. Third,
whenever the factual circumstances require the elimination of the
privileged position of white Americans, the judge subscribing to white
supremacy concludes that the privilege is too important to change-the
16. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977) (majority opinion
authored by Stewart, J.) ("The essence of a correctional counselor's job is to maintain
prison security [and a] woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male maximum
security [prison] could be directly reduced by her womanhood."). Judges are much more
likely to make stereotypic statements about the gender or sexual preferences than about
race, though racial stereotypes are not totally absent from court opinions:
On a relative and statistical basis, women may well be impacted more by dirty
toilets than are men. But so too are women working at jobs designed to require
heavy lifting, so too are whites working in conditions of extreme heat and

sunlight; so too are those of lowland national origin in working at great altitudes,
and so too are older people working at jobs requiring great flexibility, strength
and speed.
Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 391 (6th Cir. 1987) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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white privilege assumption.18 The fourth element is the assertion that
white people involved in a legal dispute have no race-the identity
blindness assumption.
Each of the four assumptions is as old as the constitutional history
of the United States and, prior to Justice Rehnquist's appointment, the
Court had moved away from them. We have now significantly returned
to an earlier vision when white supremacist thought was much more
dominant. I will describe how the Court's story about race has changed
in that last thirty years by contrasting two opinions not written by
Justice Rehnquist. The first, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 19 was written
for a unanimous Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist's predecessor, Chief
Justice Warren Burger. The second, R.A. V. v. St. Paul,20 was written by
Justice Scalia, the colleague on the current Court who has contributed
most heavily to the implementation of Justice Rehnquist's story about
race. I will then discuss how Justice Rehnquist has contributed to this
alteration in story and the nature of the story that he has produced.
Finally, I will question and compare the story he has told about race
with the story that he tells about economics and law. In addition, I will
try to anticipate your unease regarding my point about white supremacy
by examining whether there are alternative explanations that I have
overlooked.
Before I discuss these issues I want to suggest a difficulty I have in
raising them. Over the last few decades we have become, in many
ways, less sophisticated about race than ever before in history. It has
become impossible to ask whether actions by any white person are
racist without appearing to be shrill and to be asking too difficult a
question. In this Article, I do not want to fully reclaim the ground that
has been lost, but I do want to go back to distinctions that we earlier
understood.
It is quite possible for both white and black people to hold some
views that support elements of white supremacy and other views
supportive of black people. Therefore, it is not inconsistent with my
thesis about white supremacy for someone to believe in the cultural or
18. This assumption is a variant on the notion of reactionary politics discussed by
Albert Hirschman in THE RHETORIc OF REAMCTON: PERVERSrrY, FUTELrT, JEOPARDY 81-132
(1991). He calls this ploy the jeopardy thesis, arguing that conservative reactionaries
often make reactionary arguments against change based upon the assumed potential danger
to more important concerns.
19. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
20. 505 U.S.

-,

112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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biological inferiority of black people and to find that blacks make good
basketball players, Olympic runners, or singers. 21 As I have suggested
in another context, the personal activities of an individual are not a
defense to these claims of white supremacy. 22 Such views of black
people have always been held by the many white and some black
Americans who have been the leading proponents of white supremacy.
lII. FROM GRIGGS TO R.A. V.: THE DECLINING
DISCOURSE ABOUT RACE

In 1971, the year Justice Rehnquist was confirmed to the Court, the
most important racial issue was the interpretation of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. Title VII of the Act, which became effective in July 1965,
outlawed employment discrimination with respect to race and other
characteristics. Chief Justice Burger's unanimous opinion in Griggs
was the first Supreme Court interpretation of Title VII, reflecting a
change in the Supreme Court's discourse about race. Griggs may have
been the first 23 Supreme Court opinion rejecting all four of the
21. Indeed, the first refuge of a racist will be to find some small attribute that may be
superior in a group that is otherwise viewed as inferior. This permits the second
generation to deny that he is racist while at the same time maintaining important racist
views. The "darky" who can sing or recite or the black athlete who can compete are all
views of black people that have evolved over time in our racist past. See generally DAVID

T. GOLDBERG,

RACIST CuLTuRE: PHILosoPY AND PoLrmcs OF MEANING 111-16

(1993).

22. See Culp, supra note 8. People often respond to charges that they have done
something racist by claiming that they have done something useful for a person of the
opposite race. See, e.g., Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987): "I will
not respond to Kennedy's suggestion that 'even more than is usually so, [Elman's]
recollections reflect biases' against black people 'that tell us more about the observer
than the events observed.' The answer to that is my entire life." Id. at 1957 (quoting
Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1944 (1987)
(responding to Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter,and Civil
Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1987))). Such
responses miss the point. Good people can do something that is racist or amounts to
white supremacy without always doing racist things. White supremacy and racism are
deeply embedded in the social discourse. See generally Culp, supra note 8.
23. Some of the cases more firmly within the constitutional structure rejected only
parts of this framework. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The
Brown Court accepted the view that the issue of discrimination should be examined
through the lens of the majority, which is that of whites. Supporters of Brown had
difficulty with this view and its implications. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959) (arguing that constitutional
interpretation should be based upon a set of neutral principles, but often is not). But see
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960) (the notion that race was not at the heart of discrimination in the South is
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assumptions that underlie white supremacist discourse. 24 The Court
made it clear that it would examine at least some of the important
concerns of difference and history that underlie much of our racial past.
The Court said the Congressional intent was plainly stated in the statute:
"to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees. "25
When making assumptions about the intellectual and economic facts
in the case, the Court did not assume that blacks were inferior. The
Court said:
Because they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior
education in segregated schools ....
Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or
promotion may not provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of
the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress
has now required that the posture and condition of the job seeker be taken
into account....
On the record before us, neither the high school completion
requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a
demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which
it was used. Both were adopted, as the Court of Appeals noted, without
26
meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance ability.

Comparing the Court's opinion in Griggs with the 1992 opinion in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,27 a case involving the First Amendment, it is
easy to see how far we have traveled from the rejection of white
supremacist rhetoric. R.A. V. involved the attempt by the city of St. Paul
to enforce its hate speech crime act against one of the oldest forms of
laughable and ignores the reality of the southern experience with race and the law); see
also Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to
Replicate the Disease?,78 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1992) (Supreme Court erred by translating
black Americans' demands for equality into a begging for social welfare programs, thereby
failing to eradicate the causes of the inequality). See generally SHADES OF BROWN: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON ScHOOL DESEGREGATION

(Derrick Bell ed., 1980); Jerome M. Culp, Jr.,

Black People in White Fact: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. (forthcoming January 1995).
24. It is important to note that rejecting these assumptions does not necessarily
make the opinion infallible or even appropriate for circumstances existing then or now.
The rejection of white supremacist discourse, while important, is only one step toward
changing the way black Americans are adversely impacted by the law.
25. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
27. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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hate crime-the burning of a cross to terrorize a black family. 28 The
perpetrators were juveniles who fashioned a crude cross out of a chair
and burned it on private property.
The issue of race is dealt with gingerly in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion. He identifies the victims as a black family, yet fails to identify
the race of the perpetrators, only their status as juveniles. 29 The story
told in Justice Scalia's opinion is that the perpetrators did not have a
race, and, therefore, this was just good clean juvenile fun untainted by
any effort to exercise racial privilege. This story demonstrates the
identity blindness assumption and the interest blindness assumption. In
addition, when Justice Scalia examines applicable case law and the
implementation of the statute, he wrestles with almost no racial
examples. The one exception is powerful precisely in what is not said:
[T]hey assert that the ordinance helps to ensure the basic human rights of
members of groups that have historically been subjected to
discrimination, including the right of such group members to live in
peace where they wish. We do not doubt that these interests are
compelling, and that the ordinance can be said to promote them. But the
"danger of censorship" presented by a facially content-based statute...
requires that that weapon be employed only where it is "necessary to
serve the asserted [compelling] interest .

. ." The existence of adequate

content-neutral alternatives thus "undercut[s] significantly" any defense
of such a statute .... 30

Justice Scalia avoids dealing with the racial aspects of this case by
not naming the interest groups affected, draining race from the parties
involved. Though I think the result is a great constitutional tragedy, that
is not the concern I am raising in this discussion. The Court is simply
hiding the interests of white people while ignoring the situation of black
people. This type of rhetoric demonstrates the status quo and interest

28. Racial violence to keep blacks in their place has existed from almost the

beginning of their experience in colonial America. See A. LEON

HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE
MATrER OF COLOR (1978). The Civil War altered the legal status of black people,

necessitating a change in the means used for racial oppression. Thus, the Ku Klux Klan
was created, instituting the "midnight ride." See generally WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S
EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL
(1991); WYNC. WADE, THE FIERY CROSS (1987).

1861-1915

29. 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
30. 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (citations omitted) (second and third alterations in
original).
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blindness assumptions.31 The most striking aspect of this opinion is
that Justice Scalia is joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had
previously voted in a flag burning case 32 for the states' right to have
some nonneutral content-based restrictions on speech. While the Chief
Justice does not explain his switch, it seems to be a view about the types
of important interests which ought to be protected. Accordingly, this
First Amendment opinion and its interaction with the notion of equality
embedded in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments is given
additional power.
R.A. V. is an odd opinion for two reasons. It suggests that the racial
neutrality argument is not a defense to old-fashioned racism, and that no
doctrine, no matter how old or settled, will be safe if the doctrine
conflicts with important white interests. In R.A.V., the municipal statute,
as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, was directed towards
acts amounting to "fighting words."' 3 3 Despite accepting this
interpretation, 34 all nine Justices concluded that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it embraced some protected speech. Justice
Scalia concluded that this statute fails precisely because it
"discriminated" between the kinds of speech that it protected. 35 This
amounts to placing racist conduct in the same category as political
discourse, contrary to other views expressed by Justice Scalia regarding
36
the First Amendment.
31. There is also an echo of Justice Bradley's famous quotation in the Civil Rights
Cases that there has to be a time when blacks stop being the special favorites of the law:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation
has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some
stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a
man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected ....
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
32. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
33. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 509 (1991). "Fighting words" is used to denote a
category of speech, the prevention and punishment of which does not raise a First
Amendment problem. The Court first recognized this category in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). However, the exception created by the Chaplinsky
Court has had practically no impact on the Court's subsequent First Amendment
jurisprudence.
34. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
35. Id. at 2550.
36. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited,
certain activities not because they harm others but because they are considered . . .
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IV. REHNQUIST'S CONTRIBUTION
Certainly no American text of the sort I am discussing was written for
black people-no more than Uncle Tom's Cabin was written for Uncle
Tom to read or be persuaded by .... [T]he subject of the dream is the

dreamer.

37

Justice Rehnquist is certainly the most hostile justice toward claims
of civil rights in this half century and in terms of the norms of his time
perhaps ever. 38 As first an Associate Justice and then As Chief Justice
he has opposed permitting the use of government to eliminate the
vestiges of discrimination in cases as diverse as employment
discrimination and jury selection. He has found few civil rights that he
finds important to protect that will redound to the benefit of black
citizens and others of color. He has worked to essentially eviscerate the
effects of the two most important civil rights statutes of the second
reconstruction: the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act. Others have chronicled the extent to which he has been hostile to
those interests. 39 I want to emphasize that the issue I raise is not about
his conservatism but the story he is telling about race and the law. It is
that story that has left black citizens at the mercy of limited government
protection and subject to overt private and public restrictions. 40
immoral. In American society, such prohibitions have included, for example,
sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and sodomy.").
37. ToNi MORRISON, PLAYIN' INTHE DARK: WwrENSs AND TmE LrrmRARY IMAGINATION

(1992).
38. See supra note 8 (especially the discussion of Segal and Spaeth's study).
39. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Affirmative Action, Equal Access and the Supreme
Court's 1988 Term: The Rehnquist Court Takes a Sharp Turn to the Right, 18 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1057 (1990); Brian Landsberg, Equal EducationalOpportunity: The Rehnquist Court
Revisits Green and Swann, 42 EMORY L.J. 821 (1993) (the Court, led by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, has been moving away from the principles in Green and Swann); Brian
Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. Rnv. 1267 (1992) (in the 29 cases
involving race, the Rehnquist Court has narrowed the legacy of the Burger Court).
40. I do not mean to suggest that Justice Rehnquist is completely beyond the
possibility of redemption in terms of the story he is telling in race cases. He has
occasionally supported the interests of black people. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222 (1985) (majority opinion by Rehnquist found that article of Alabama
Constitution which prohibits citizens from voting if they violate moral standards was
adopted partially as a means of excluding black citizens from voting; article is not saved
because legislature also intended to prevent poor whites, as well .as all blacks, from
voting). The Chief Justice was willing to reject the blandishments of Justice Thomas's
concurrence in Holder v. Hall, _ U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2581 (1994), that would have gutted
the Voting Rights Act. Unlike Justice Thomas, he is not willing to completely ignore 20
years of jurisprudence to eviscerate congressional action that he does not like. However,
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Justice Rehnquist joined the Burger Court shortly after it had
unanimously decided Griggs. In one of his first opinions, Jefferson v.
Hackney,4 1 he reintroduced the white supremacist elements of interest
blindness and status quo blindness. 42 The state of Texas participated in
the federal assistance program. However, the Texas Constitution placed
limits on the total resources the state could allocate to welfare
payments. 43 To meet this constitutional limit, the state initially cut aid to
the blind and disabled by five percent and aid to dependent children by
fifty percent. 4 The state did not reduce assistance to the elderly.
Plaintiffs, recipients of Aid For Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) in Texas, challenged the constitutionality of applying a lower
percentage reduction factor to AFDC than the other three categorical
programs. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the decision to treat these
programs differently did not violate the statutory requirements of federal
law nor the constitutional limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. 45
In coming to this conclusion, he told a story about race contradicting
that told by the Griggs Court.
Justice Rehnquist applied the interest blindness concern to this
case.46 Ignoring the interests of black people, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
one would be more comfortable with the possibility that this was a permanent change in
the story he is telling if one were certain that he would not provide the fifth vote for this
position in the future. See discussion of R.A.V. supra notes 27-36.
41. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
42. See infra notes 46, 49 and accompanying text. Professor Ross has correctly
noted the extent to which other Justices have contributed to this story. He attributes the
notion of innocence to a number of decisions written by Justice Powell and to dissenting
opinions written by Justice Stewart. See Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, supra
note 3. The notion of innocence is certainly a way of reproducing aspects of what I call
white supremacy. I believe it is fair to attribute this to Justice Rehnquist because he was
raising similar concerns in other areas.
43. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537.
44. At the time of the hearing before the Court, this had been raised to 75%. Id. at
537 n.3.
45. Id. at 543-47.
46. For other cases that support this doctrine, see, e.g., Prince Edward School
Foundation v. United States, 450 U.S. 944 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (school with history of discrimination against blacks can prove
nondiscrimination by simply asserting nondiscrimination policy). Rehnquist's dissent
argues of a view of discrimination out of sync with our times and embodies interest
blindness and no race assumptions. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 617 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (IRS did not have congressional support for
such a far-reaching policy of nondiscrimination) with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991) (majority opinion authored by Rehnquist, C.J.) (Rehnquist supports agency
determination of congressional policy that vastly expands the congressional language
and policy). The Chief Justice manipulates theory to find a policy that supports the status

1994]

UNDERSTANDING RACIAL DISCOURSE

611

Appellants are thus left with their naked statistical argument: that there is
a larger percentage of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in AFDC than in
the other programs, and that the AFDC is funded at 75% whereas the
other programs are funded at 95% and 100% of recognized need. As the
statistics cited in the footnote demonstrate, the number of minority
members in all categories is substantial. The basic outlines of eligibility
for the various categorical grants are established by Congress, not by the
States; given the heterogeneity of the Nation's population, it would be
only an infrequent coincidence that the racial composition of each grant
class was identical to that of the others. The acceptance of appellants'
constitutional theory would render suspect each difference in treatment
among the grant classes, however lacking in racialmotivation and however
otherwise rationalthe treatment might be. Few legislative efforts to deal
with the difficult problems posed by current welfare programs could
survive such scrutiny, and we do not find it required by the Fourteenth
47
Amendment.

Justice Rehnquist argued that the change in reimbursement standards
for the AFDC programs was not infected with discrimination because
the welfare department did not know the makeup of the program and
had no discriminatory intent. 48 He concluded that a standard specifically
quo of racial discrimination and white supremacy embedded in the social structures that
produced Bob Jones University and Prince Edward County. See also Board of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (majority opinion authored by Rehnquist, C.J.) (approving
the ending of court supervision of school system because the effects of de jure segregation
had been eliminated). Rehnquist goes out of his way to find that the effects of long history
of discrimination have been eliminated in the 13 years since the Court first began efforts
to remedy legal discrimination. Rehnquist supports all four of the assumptions that
genuflect to a status quo that does not eliminate white supremacy.
47. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 548 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
48. Justice Rehnquist wrote in support:
The three-judge court found that the "payment by Texas of a lesser percentage of
unmet needs to the recipients of the AFDC than to the recipients of other welfare
programs is not the result of racial or ethnic prejudice and is not violative of the
federal Civil Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment."
The District Court obviously gave careful consideration to this issue, and we are
cited by its opinion to a number of subsidiary facts to support its principal
finding quoted above. There has never been a reduction in the amount of money
appropriated by the legislature to the AFDC program, and between 1943 and the
date of the opinion below there had been five increases in the amount of money
appropriated by the legislature for the program, two of them having occurred since
1959. The overall percentage increase in appropriation for the programs between
1943 and the time of the District Court's hearing in this case was 410% for AFDC,
as opposed to 211% for OAA and 200% for AB.The court further concluded [that]
"[tihe depositions of Welfare officials conclusively establish that the defendants
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embracing black people's interests would make the legislative process
unworkable. This is a version of the status quo perspective underlying
Justice Rehnquist's story about race, a view leaving the concerns of
black plaintiffs outside the law's reach. Though such a conclusion is not
new, 49 it has been reinvigorated by Justice Rehnquist's work.
The history of discrimination in Texas makes the district court's
conclusion suspect. 50 In spite of the demographic profile of welfare
recipients in Texas, the Court does not recognize race as playing a role
in Texas's decision. 51 It is hard to imagine the kind of ignorance about
did not know the racial make-up of the various welfare assistance categories prior
to or at the time when the orders here under attack were issued."
Id. at 547 (footnote omitted).
49. See, e.g., Culp, supra note 6.
50. Justice Marshall points out part of the story in his dissent:
The record contains numerous statements by state officials to the effect that AFDC
is funded at a lower level than the other programs because it is not a politically
popular program. There is also evidence of a stigma that seemingly attaches to
AFDC recipients and no others. This Court noted in King v. Smith, 392 U.S., at
322, that AFDC recipients were often frowned upon by the community. The
evidence also shows that 87% of the AFDC recipients in Texas are either Negro or
Mexican-American. Yet, both the District Court and this Court have little
difficulty in concluding that the fact that AFDC is politically unpopular and the
fact that AFDC recipients are disfavored by the State and its citizens, have
nothing whatsoever to do with the racial makeup of the program. This conclusion
is neither so apparent, nor so correct in my view.
Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. The Court suggests there was no discrimination because the welfare officials did

not know the recipients' racial makeup. While at some level this may be true, a look at the
largest programs, assistance for older citizens (OAA) and AFDC, reveals that the one that
received the least reduction as white and the one that suffered the largest as nonwhite.
Prgram

Y=r

OAA

1969
1968
1967

39.8
38.7
37.0

60.2
61.3
63.0

230,000

1969
1968
1967

46.9
45.6
46.2

53.1
54.4
53.8

4,213

1969
1968

55.7
54.9

44.3
45.1

1969
1968
1967

87.0
84.9
86.0

13.0
15.1
14.0

APTD

AB
AFDC

Percentage of Blacks. Pentagc
Mexican-Americans
White-Anglos

Number of Recipients

14,043
136,000
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program recipients postulated by the courts, since fears about the nature
52
of welfare recipients still exist in our thinking about welfare and race.
Justice Rehnquist does not require the Court to deal with the harsher
impact of its decisions on racial minorities, permitting excuses that, as
Justice Marshall points out, do not hold water. 53 Justice Rehnquist
concludes that the proposed neutral standards suggested by the state are
sufficient to meet the rational basis test of the Constitution:
Applying the traditional standard of review under that amendment, we
cannot say that Texas' decision to provide somewhat lower welfare
benefits for AFDC recipients is invidious or irrational. Since budgetary
constraints do not allow the payment of the full standard of need for all
welfare recipients, the State may have concluded that the aged and
infirm are the least able of the categorical grant recipients to bear the
Id. at 548 n.17.
52. See, e.g., CHRIsTOPmER JENCKS, RETHINN SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND
THE UNDERCLASS (1992) (welfare is a program that is not very extensive; most of the
recipients already supplement their incomes through work or other family help because
almost no welfare recipient can make it on the existing income assistance).
53. Justice Marshall argued that:
Although the District Court accepted the State's contentions that there are
differences between AFDC children and other recipients which warranted different
treatment under the federal statutes, I find each of the reasons offered totally
unpersuasive.
First, Texas argues that AFDC children can be employed, whereas recipients of
other benefits cannot be. Assuming arguendo that this is true, it is an argument
that falls of its own weight. Whatever income the children earn is subtracted from
need, or it is excluded from consideration under 402(a)(8) to encourage self-help.
Thus, income is already reflected in the computation of payments, or it is excluded
in order that a specific legislative goal may be furthered ....
Second, the State maintains that AFDC families can secure help from legally
responsible relatives more easily than recipients under other programs. Assuming
again for purposes of discussion that this is true, it should be plain that any
support from any relatives is subtracted from the State's grant ....
Third, Texas points to the likelihood of future employment for AFDC
recipients, a likelihood that it says is nonexistent for older persons and others
who receive aid. Federal law provides that a State may only consider income that
is currently available in allocating funds. 45 CFR § 233.20(a)(3)(ii). This
contention is therefore irrelevant.
The State makes only two other arguments. One has already been rejected.
Texas urges that the purposes of the federal programs differ, but the history belies
this contention. The other is that the numbers of AFDC recipients is rising and
this program should therefore bear the burden of monetary limitations. The
obvious problem with this argument is that . . . Congress has indicated that
increased eligibility for AFDC is desirable ....
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hardships of an inadequate standard of living. While different policy
judgments are of course possible, it is not irrational for the State to
believe that the young are more adaptable than the sick and elderly,
especially because the latter have less hope of improving their situation
in the years remaining to them. Whether or not one agrees with this state
54
determination, there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids it.

The story appears on its face to be uninvolved with race but it has,
buried in its structure, the full panoply of concerns about the impact on
citizens of color. 55 The story Justice Rehnquist tells assumes that the
status quo is fine, that the interests of black people are not important to
this determination, that white people do not have a color and that it is
possible, therefore, to be neutral about the structure of the Equal
Protection Clause.
We see a similar discourse about race in another of Justice
Rehnquist's first opinions, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.5 6 A black
state legislator denied service in a private club claimed that the club's
liquor license was state action; therefore, the denial of service was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Rehnquist found no issue of constitutional magnitude implicated
by the state's help in providing a liquor license to someone wanting to
engage in racial discrimination, concluding:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the
private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State,
or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since statefurnished services include such necessities of life as electricity, water,
and police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the

Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 579-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 549.
55. Except where noted, my discussion of race will be about black and white racial
issues. It should be clear to any participant in the discussion that other people of color,
other disfavored minority groups, and women are sometimes influenced by similar issues.
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (Fourth Amendment not
violated by routine visual searches of cars near the border). The Martinez-Fuerte Court is
not concerned that the check points to catch "illegal aliens" are primarily concerned with
catching brown and, to a lesser extent, black people. The Court seems to conclude that the
intrusion on the Fourth Amendment is small since most white people will not be subject
to this kind of border stop.
56. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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distinction between private as distinguishedfrom state conduct set forth in
The Civil Rights Cases ... and adheredto in subsequent decisions .... 57

Justice Rehnquist sees the concerns of the private club's white
patrons as being paramount. He starts with a notion that the status quo
of the liquor license is appropriate, because in some situations the black
plaintiffs are not permitted to apply or purchase a liquor license for their
own club, public or private. He ignores the cost of being a racial
minority in that situation. Representative Irvis was not seeking to leave
the comforts of his home community in the Hill District in Pittsburgh,
but to get a drink in Harrisburg near the state capital where he served his
constituents. The club's refusal was to him a public refusal because of
the nature of the Harrisburg community and because, as a member of a
racial minority, it is not always possible to reproduce what the majority
community does. Justice Rehnquist implies that the injury here is the
kind of injury suffered by all of us who are refused access to places that
are private in nature. He ignores the extent to which the provision of a
liquor license in fact makes that private space very public, particularly
for those citizens who are black.
Justice Rehnquist's story infects his work in other areas. For
example, in Barclay v. Florida,58 a black defendant was found guilty of
participation in the heinous murder of a white hitchhiker. In a separate
hearing, the same jury provided an advisory recommendation: life
imprisonment for the defendant and death for his accomplice, the
apparent ring leader. The trial judge ignored the jury's recommendation
and concluded that death was appropriate for both.59 Contrary to Florida
law, facts about the murder were deemed to be aggravating
circumstances by the trial judge.60 The judge spoke of the horrors of
war and why this murder was comparable to Nazi actions in World
War 11.61 However, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the failure of the
trial court did not amount to a constitutional violation, because the
Florida Supreme Court had sufficiently examined these issues. 62
The importance of Justice Rehnquist's story is obvious if one
examines a case like Barclay.Justice Rehnquist does not see the extent
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 944.
Id. at 945.
id. at 948, 948-49 n.6.
Id. at 956-58.
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to which the white judge is out of control in his application of apparently
neutral standards to this black defendant. The Court should have
carefully scrutinized this case, since extensive evidence had been
presented regarding the power of race to influence a case's outcome.
Instead, Justice Rehnquist applied the most limited review of the case,
ignored some case law on point, and suggested that the issue of whether
a court has adhered to its own standards does not violate the
Constitution.
The story that Justice Rehnquist tells is, once again, extremely
limited and exclusive of the interests of black people. The status quo
with respect to criminal procedure is assumed to be fair despite ample
opposing evidence in the record. The story, properly understood, is that
black criminal defendants do not have rights. This is easiest to see if one
reads the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion reducing Barclay's
sentence to life imprisonment. The court concludes that the district court
had not adhered to important constitutional and other procedures in
sentencing the defendant to death.
The powerful story told by Justice Rehnquist can be read in a
number of important cases. Dissenting in Batson v. Kentucky, Justice
Rehnquist concludes that "there is simply nothing 'unequal' about the
state using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the jury in
cases involving black defendants so long as such challenges are also
used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants. ' 63 He
concluded that past discrimination is not relevant in examining the
failure of blacks to vote. 64 He does not see that the notion of normality
assumes the status quo is sufficient in cases involving the test standards
for hiring determinations. 65
The most powerful indictment of Justice Rehnquist's story was his
vote in Shaw v. Reno. 66 In Shaw, five white plaintiffs argued that the
creation of districts with a majority of African-Americans violated their
63. 476 U.S. 79, 137 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
64. Mississippi Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002, 1013
(1984) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting from denial of certiorari). This contradicts the principles
that underlie the Voting Rights Act and common sense.
65. See Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 469 U.S. 1117, 1120-21
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). An alteration in the normalization curves for black
candidates is an inappropriate response to the failure of black plaintiffs to live up to the
norm. This view of such normalization led Democrats to alter the 1991 Civil Rights Act in
order to prohibit such policies, in spite of strong evidence that in terms of professional

norms, such normalization can be appropriate.
66. 509 U.S.

-,

113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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rights. Justice O'Connor, writing for a five-person majority including
the Chief Justice, concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a race,
explicitly making the identity blindness assumption. However, to allow
these claims, the Justices had to resolve the question of plaintiff injury.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Jefferson set the standard for much of the
Court's jurisprudence. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that showing only a
possible connection is insufficient because it would cripple effective
legislative action. 67 How this same Justice can be part of a five-person
majority in Shaw can only be explained by his support for white
supremacy. The Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, does not
claim white supremacy is the goal of the opinion. However, there is no
other explanation for the Court's reasoning that any exercise of power
by a black majority threatens the Constitution while the one hundred
year history of white gerrymandering is simply irrelevant.
Shaw is color blind in the same sense that R.A. V. is color blind.
Both assume that white supremacy, the racial status quo, is an
appropriate base line and that any deviation from that status quo
invades a protected right. For the white juveniles of St. Paul, the
deviation from the status quo was an effort to limit the absolute right of
white people to frighten black people with "political speech." For white
people who reside in the congressional district in North Carolina, this
includes the right to maintain control over the political process despite a
history of oppression. 68 Some would defend Justice Rehnquist by
contending that he was simply seeking the colorblind solution, but
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw admits that race will be considered.
There is no color blindness if some, but not all, use of race is improper,
and that use is connected to the empowerment of black people.
V. BAD MEN ARE NOT NECESSARILY RACIST: THE ECONOMIC
DISCOURSE OF JUSTICE REHNQUIST

By examining Justice Rehnquist's economic discourse, one can see
his keen analytic mind at work. He is a very sophisticated jurist with
respect to economic issues, 69 able to examine the impact of law on the
67. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
68. This oppression can be seen in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and
also in the fact that 40 counties in North Carolina are still covered by the Voting Rights
Act.
69. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984).
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marginal participant. Similarly, he is able to examine the ex ante and ex
post concerns of legal situations. I want to suggest, however, that his
story about race is, ultimately, the dominant story of his career.
Economic issues are buried within both the Jefferson70 and Moose
Lodge71 opinions. However, in neither case does Justice Rehnquist
utilize economic factors in reaching his decision. Ultimately, it seems,
economics does not matter when race is involved. Moose Lodge
concerned the limited number of liquor licenses allocated in a
community under control of the government. Justice Rehnquist,
ignoring the economic question, reasoned that this limit is not likely to
be important in many situations. He did not consider the impact of this
limitation on black plaintiffs who are, like the traveler at early common
law, unlikely to be able to find a place to drink.72 An economicallyfocused story may not have changed the outcome, but it would certainly
have altered the the factors he discussed. One of these factors would
have been the economic impact on black people due to an inequitable
distribution of a limited state resource-liquor licenses.
Similarly, the Jefferson Court's rational basis scrutiny of the
legislature's decision ultimately depends upon the legislature's
explanation, in partially economic terms, of the differences between
AFDC and other recipients. Justice Rehnquist assumed that the average
return to the participants was the predominant concern, ignoring the
extent to which statutory requirements make the marginal incentive the
same for all groups. Justice Rehnquist's result is not necessarily wrong,
but the story he tells in reaching that result echoes most powerfully the
interests of white citizens at the expense of important concerns of black
citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have long indulged civil rights plaintiffs. Prior to the
Supreme Court's 1988 decision in [Wards Cove7 3 ], for example, federal
courts habitually ignored the traditional allocation of burdens of
persuasion and production in civil litigation by shifting the burden of
70. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
72. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-77 (1972). The recent
incidents with respect to the Shoal Creek Country Club are but the tip of the iceberg with
respect to the extent of exclusion faced by racial minorities and, to a lesser extent these
days, by religious groups and women.
73. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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persuasion in Title VH disparate impact cases from the plaintiff to the
accused employer, and "thus overturning eight centuries of
jurisprudence." In Ward's Cove, [sic] the Supreme Court disapproved this
supererogatory coddling of civil rights plaintiffs, admonishing that "[tihe
burden of persuasion... remains with the disparate impact plaintiff." The
Supreme -Court thereby restored to normality the method for allocating
74
burdens of persuasionand production in Title VII disparateimpact cases.

The nature of Justice Rehnquist's story about race is important
because it leaves significant concerns unexamined and, therefore, not
included. Students increasingly come to my classes with an incorrect
assumption about the state of the law and black people, as typified by
the opening quote in this section. Normality is seen in a particularly
stilted way, where black employment discrimination plaintiffs, criminal
law defendants and concerns in tort matters are not part of the discourse.
Students see normality from a white perspective, a result brought about
by the racial story told to their generation. This story excluded black
concerns, thereby leaving white majority concerns as the norm.
If students perceive civil rights plaintiffs as special favorites of the
law, there will be no mercy or justice for these plaintiffs. However,
simply telling the story of black people will not ensure that justice
triumphs. If this were true, powerful stories of black injustice would
echo within the opinions of Justices Kennedy, Thomas, 7 5 and
O'Connor. The truth is, story is only a beginning of discourse, not an
end of justice or truth. Judges failing to understand this are ignorant to
the extent of their involvement in racism. Justice Marshall's great
contribution has been, and will continue to be, his ability to say that
there is an untold powerful story that needs examination in the bright
sunshine of judicial deliberation. Conversely, Justice Rehnquist's legacy
74. Jeffrey D. Hanslick, Comment, Decisions Denying the Appointment of Counsel
and the Final Judgment Rule in Civil Rights Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 782, 782
(1992) (emphasis added) (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
This view of the recent history of civil rights plaintiffs is wrong. Courts have often put
the burden of proof on defendants in situations both inside and outside the civil rights
context. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON Er

AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

259 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); Francis H. Bohlen, The
Effect of Rebuttable Presumptionsof Law Upon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307
(1920). Indeed, one can see a shift in the burden of proof to defendants in a number of
areas, especially those shifting from a negligence standard toward strict liability. While
this trend may be distasteful (or even wrong), the trend is evident in a significant set of
differing circumstances.
75. See discussion of Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, supra note 40.
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will be his efforts to bury important concerns of black participants in the
American legal system.

